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Introduction – The Evolution of Safeguards 
CSA AP IS 
   INFCIRC/153 NFCIRC/540 -- 
Basic 
principle 
NMAC extended declaration by 
state 
CA 
Measures Detect diversion of 
nucl. mat. 
Verify absence of 
undecl. material and 
activities  
Combination of traditional 
and strengthened 
measures 
1971 * 1997 * >1999 
*) Year of approval by IAEA Board of Governors 
Copyright IAEA 
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Integrated Safeguards in the EU 
 Euratom Treaty  EC takes role of safeguards 
authority as a RSAC (INFCIRC/193) 
 New Partnership Approach agreed between EC 
and IAEA (1992), e.g. 
• Joint inspections 
• Sharing of documents and data 
• Joint use of equipment 
 Broader Conclusion drawn for all 24 NNWS 
with significant nuclear activities 
 Introduction of IS in 2010  
Changes through IS: 
 Reduced timeliness goals for verification of nuclear material 
 Reduced verification requirements for less sensitive types of facilities 
 Principle of unpredictability 
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Role of Equipment for IS Implementation – Example 1 
Short-Notice Random Inspections (SNRI) as a moment of unpredictability 
 Unannounced inspection on randomly selected site leads to difficulties 
 Joint inspection with Euratom not possible 
 Usually preparation time to arrange inspector access required 
 Instead of UI, 24-48 h notice time is introduced  SNRI 
 Condition: Optical surveillance to cover the notice period 
 Application of Remote Data Transmission (RDT): check State-of-Health 
(SoH) of surveillance during notice period 
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Role of Equipment for IS Implementation – Example 2 
Castor cask sealing by Euratom or operator 
 IS: Application of electr. seal on loaded cask 
under surveillance by EURATOM or operator 
 Operator requires a confirmation, whether seal 
attachment procedure was successful 
      „User Terminal“ for cask-sealing 
• Step-by-step Instructions 
• Feedback to the user 
• Confirmation on successful completion of the 
procedure 
 Application of RDT to retrieve SoH and sensor 
data (Seal + surveillance) prior and after sealing 
procedure Configuration of „IT 90“ 
Source: JOPAG/06.92-PRG-232, 
Forschungszentrum Jülich 
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Equipment Features – „Smart Sensors“  
 Digital Sensors 
 Digital authentication in proximity to the 
sensor 
 Data encryption 
 Local data storage, plus autonomy from 
external power 
 Data transmission capabilities 
 Tamper-indicating enclosure of sensor 
 Favourable equipment features for IS 
implementation 
 
 Unattended 
 Autonomous 
 RDT capable 
 Provides State-of-Health data 
 Allows data sharing for joint-use 
 Data integration 
 Permits delegation of tasks to the 
RSAC/operator 
Equipment Features for IS: „Smart Sensors“ *: 
*) See also G. Neumann, K. Gaertner, B. Richter (1997): “The Use 
of Smart Sensors and its Implications on Safeguards Procedures”, 
Proc. 38th INMM Annual Meeting 
M. Stein, et al. (2009): „The Next Generation Surveillance System, Development Project 
Overview“, Proc. 31st ESARDA Annual Meeting, Vilnius, Lithuania 
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Radiation Detection Systems as „Smart Sensors“ 
e.g. Multi-channel analyzer with digital pulse processing 
 Data storage on device 
 Data communication 
 Information on SoH: 
 Internal Temperature, Detector temperature 
 Diagnostics of analog detector signals (‚oscilliscope 
mode‘) 
 pre-amp supply currents 
 Add encryption + authentication 
 Add tamper-indicating enclosure 
 
 
GBS Elektronik, “MCA-527 Digital 
Multi-Channel Analyzer User 
Manual”,          http://www.gbs-
elektronik.de 
Sensor Head Detector 
electronics module 
Det. voltage, power supply 
Det. signals 
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Summary 
Implications of Integrated Safeguards 
 less effort for on-site verification 
 Longer time-intervalls between inspections 
 Increased importance of unattended sensors and RDT 
 Reliance on IAEA/RSAC cooperation 
 Benefits from smartly designed equipment 
 Further improvement by integration of data from various sensors 
